From Victory to Peace (NIU Series in Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies) by Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter

Author:Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter [Wirtschafter, Elise Kimerling & Wirtschafter, Elise Kimerling]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781501756030
Publisher: Cornell University Press
Published: 2020-12-14T16:00:00+00:00

Russia Chooses Peace

Although recent scholarship focuses on Austrian-British efforts to block Russian action during the crisis of 1821–22, there can be no question but that Emperor Alexander I sought to avoid war. Clearly, the monarch continued to see the European alliance as the best means to preserve peace. This is why historians of the Greek independence movement are careful to distinguish the rebels’ expectations of Russian support from the actual assistance they did or did not receive.64 Dmitrii P. Tatishchev’s 1822 missions to the Austrian court—missions that Alexander hoped would persuade the allies to act in concert (concerter) to protect Russia’s treaty rights—embodied the commitment to allied unity. The impetus to send Tatishchev to Vienna was Emperor Alexander’s ongoing disappointment with efforts to dispel what he considered the Porte’s illusions. None of the allies, especially Austria and Britain, had committed to strong support of Russian interests. After close to a year of diplomatic conversation and evasion, Austria had failed to press upon the Porte the legitimacy of Russia’s demands. Instead, the threat of war had increased. To rectify this situation, Tatishchev received orders to convince Metternich of the need for (and justice of) forceful concerted action and, once again, to assess what Austria’s reaction would be, if the Russian monarch decided to go to war.65

Emperor Alexander’s instructions to Tatishchev appeared in a rescript dated 5/17 February 1822.66 From the outset the monarch made clear that Tatishchev’s mission concerned the most vital interests—interests that the crisis in the East threatened and that could be protected only through the general alliance, as opposed to the exclusive combinations of the old policy.67 The substantive instructions began with a summary of Alexander’s response to Austria’s proposals of 23 December 1821 concerning Russia’s claims against the Porte, which was also transmitted to his agents at allied courts.68 By the time of the mission, Austria had assumed the lead role in allied negotiations with Constantinople, and as the Russian monarch made clear, at the Vienna court Tatishchev spoke for his sovereign. As the instructions emphasized, even though Austria represented the most likely allied participant in the crisis, Alexander expected cooperation from all the great powers. Repeatedly, he insisted that the grave matters at hand needed to be resolved collectively “in the spirit of the alliance and for the common salvation [salut] of all the States of Europe.” According to the monarch, the current task of the European allies was to protect interests threatened by the crisis in the Levant, if necessary by deploying an armed force that would act for the general good in the name of the alliance.69 The interests at stake represented one aspect of Russia’s relations with the Porte, and to compromise those interests would threaten the order of things enshrined in established treaties.

Having identified Russia’s interests with the common European good and desire for peace, Emperor Alexander highlighted the danger posed by allied inaction and by failure to convince the Porte to change course so that diplomatic relations with Russia could be restored.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.